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Abstract 
State revenue production since the third wave of democratization contrasts sharply with the 
experiences of the first and second waves of democratization. The late democratizers tend to 
adopt and raise revenue from a regressive tax on consumption (the value-added tax: VAT), 
which is more compatible with economic development in global markets but is considered as 
unequal taxation. How does the weak redistributive (i.e., regressive) effect of this form of 
taxation affect the welfare of people? We build on conventional wisdom that democratic 
accountability through multiparty contestation improves human development. Focused on 
taxation, we argue that an increasing state financial capacity contributes to an increase in 
human development, even when electoral contestation is absent. Empirical analyses 
employed a reduction in infant mortality as an indicator for the improvement of human 
development and demonstrate the counter-intuitive effect of the VAT on human development. 
Despite the effect of weak redistribution, the VAT contributes to human development in 
countries with less democratic accountability. The results also show WKDWWKHVWDWH¶Vfinancial 
capacity to secure tax compliance, rather than a mere increase in tax revenue, intervenes 
critically in such development in countries since the third wave. We conclude that the 
increased state financial capacity with regressive taxation is expected to promote human 
development in newly emerging democratic states. 
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Introduction 
Human development depends largely on the distribution of public services. In particular, how 
much services are distributed, how effective the distribution is, and how they are distributed 
are key in affecting human development (Hanson, 2015). According to previous studies, both 
democracy and state capacity are expected to positively affect these three aspects of the 
distribution and thus promote human development. The theoretical expectations are, in fact, 
confirmed by empirical analyses (Gerring et al, 2012; McGuire, 2010 for democracy; and 
Hanson, 2015 for state capacity).  
However, the literature fails to examine another important variable as a possible 
FRUUHODWHRIKXPDQGHYHORSPHQWWKDWDIIHFWVDOOWKUHHDVSHFWVRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
distribution: taxation. The level of government revenue, the effective extraction and 
distribution of revenue, and the degree of distribution are all related to taxation. This strong 
association with the distribution of public services by the government implies that taxation 
should also affect human development. Yet, we know little about the relationship between 
taxation and human development. This paper provides a novel theoretical argument about the 
relationship between taxation and human development and conducts systematic quantitative 
analyses.  
The focus on taxation is particularly relevant in the contemporary world because the 
value-added tax (VAT), instead of an income tax, has played a critical role in financing the 
emerging contemporary state (Bird and Gendron 2007; Bräutigam, Fjeldstad and Moore 
  2 
2008; Kato and Tanaka, 2018). Unlike progressive income taxation, regressive taxation on 
consumption (i.e., the VAT) facilitates economic adjustments in developing economies, but it 
applies a flat-rate, i.e., a regressive levy. Thus, it is considered to hinder socioeconomic 
equality together with the absence of effective progressive taxation (for example, see 
Bräutigam, Fjeldstad, and Moore 2008; Corbacho, Cibils, and Lora 2013).1 In this sense, the 
introduction of regressive taxation can possibly increase the level of socioeconomic 
inequality in society, thereby directly and indirectly hurting or stagnating human development, 
in particular for the poor.2   
However, by closely examining the impact of regressive taxation on human 
development, this paper argues that the VAT improves human development through 
increasing state financial capacity. Consistent with Hanson (2015), we claim that state 
capacity contributes to the improvement of human development. However, this paper 
provides a more detailed mechanism that begins with regressive taxation. The introduction of 
the VAT enhances state capacity and thereby improves human development. The VAT can 
increase the capacity to raise revenue for human development as well as increase tax 
compliance, which, in turn, makes the state apparatus more effective in distributing resources. 
Focusing on infant mortality, which the existing literature considers one of the 
primary proxies for human development, this study conducts a time-series, cross-national 
analysis and examines whether and how regressive taxation affects human development in 
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the contemporary world. Our focus on regressive taxation and state capacity qualifies the 
conventional wisdom about the association between human development and democratic 
accountability (Gerring et al., 2016; McGuire, 2010). More specifically, the analysis explores 
an interaction between democratic accountability and regressive taxation and provides a 
novel finding: even when democratic accountability is low, the introduction of regressive 
taxation can improve human development through enhancing state capacity. In other words, 
in autocracies without electoral contestation, we find that the VAT contributes to decreasing 
infant mortality. However, when a country enjoys high democratic accountability, as the 
existing studies expect (e.g., Gerring et al., 2016), electoral contestation decreases infant 
mortality and furthers human development, whereas the VAT has a negligible, albeit positive, 
effect on infant mortality. This suggests that the introduction of regressive taxation can 
generally improve human development through state financial capacity, but the size of its 
effect hinges on the presence and absence of democratic accountability.  
To explore more detailed causal mechanisms through which the VAT promotes 
human development, we also disaggregate state financial capacity into those that raise 
revenue and those that secure compliance. Using a mediation analysis, our empirical analyses 
find that the state financial capacity to secure compliance rather than its capacity to raise 
revenue critically intervenes in the effect of the VAT on human development. This indicates 
that the strength of the VAT lies in ensuring that the state regulates markets, thereby making 
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the state apparatus more effective. 
Recent literature has renewed an interest in the role of taxation in democratization 
and examined how differences in who pays how much are associated with different paths of 
democracy (Baskaran, 2014; Timmons, 2010; Kato and Tanaka, 2018). In particular, Kato 
and Tanaka (2018) find that regressive taxation goes hand-in-hand with contemporary 
democratization: the VAT, which was introduced under autocracies, is a critical correlate of 
democratization since the third wave. Taken together with this finding, this paper ultimately 
suggests that regressive taxation not only promotes human development in autocracies in the 
short-term, but can also contribute to SHRSOH¶VZHOIDUH in the long-run by increasing the 
likelihood of a democratic transition over time.  
 
Human development, democracy, and the VAT 
 Democracy is the most popular correlate of human development (Sen, 1999) and, 
among a variety of aspects of a democratic institution, electoral accountability has a strong, 
positive impact (Gerring et al., 2016; Miller, 2015).3 However, Hanson finds WKDWDVWDWH¶V
capacity, independent from democracy, improves human development (Hanson, 2015).4 
Taxation is considered a critical part RIDVWDWH¶VFDSDFLW\, and state capacity is often defined 
DV³WKHDELOLW\RIWKHVWDWHWRGRPLQDWHLHFRD[FRPSOLDQWEHKDYLRUIURPWKHLQGLYLGXDOVRI
DJLYHQWHUULWRU\DQGRSHUDWLRQDOL]HGDVWD[FRPSOLDQFH´(Ottervik, 2013). Taxation also 
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shares its historical origin with the legal capacity to support and regulate market institutions 
(Besley and Persson, 2009). Drawing on the recent literature but with a focus on taxation, this 
study FORVHO\H[DPLQHVDVWDWH¶VILQancial capacity and qualifies the view that democratic 
accountability is a primary correlate of human development. This section derives three novel 
hypotheses about the relationship between regressive taxation and human development in the 
contemporary world.  
 Today, most developing countries adopt the VAT without introducing progressive 
taxation (Kato and Tanaka, 2018). The reliance on revenue from a regressive VAT rather than 
from income taxation has often been considered an obstacle to reducing inequality (Swank, 
2016; Genschel and Seelkopf, 2016; Gemmell and Morrissey, 2005).5 A state financed solely 
by regressive taxation questions whether such countries are able to advance socioeconomic 
equality, which leads to a concern that regressive taxation may hurt human development, in 
particular, for the poor. 
 However, the VAT can increase state capacity, which is considered critical in human 
development (Hanson, 2015), thereby effectively allowing the government to pay for 
advancing human development. The VAT can contribute to an increase in state capacity with 
its revenue-increasing and compliance-enhancing features. First, many studies concur that the 
VAT, if implemented with a wide tax base, contributes to increased government revenues 
(Aizenman ad Jinjarak, 2009; Bird and Gendron, 2006; Keen and Lockwood, 2010; Rakner 
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and Gloppen, 2003; Cnossen 2015). At the same time, the VAT is expected to increase 
compliance by businesses with the government, thereby making the state apparatus more 
effective. From this, we derive that, all else being equal, the VAT enhances state financial 
capacity and thus contributes to human development. 
 %XWWKH9$7¶VLPSDFWRQKXPDQGHYHORSPHQt has important scope conditions, 
because an historical contingency affects the relationship between taxation, democracy, and 
human development. More specifically, although they have recently adopted regressive 
taxation as well, early democratizers (1st and 2nd wave democratizers) relied on progressive 
taxation, which can lead to more revenue and more redistribution than regressive taxation, 
(Kato 2003; Kato and Toyofuku 2018). At the same time, such early democratizers already 
had strong state capacity through past wars (Scheve and Stasavage 2010; Tilly, 1990). In 
addition, many comparative studies find that regardless of the timing in democratization, 
democratic accountability, rather than the state capacity, generally improves human 
development (Gerring et al., 2016). ,QOLJKWRIWKHVHVWXGLHVZHPD\REVHUYHWKH9$7¶V
greater effect on contemporary autocratic countries where democratic accountability is low 
and citizens cannot effectively demand public services that are key for human development. 
In other words, the relative effect of the VAT is conditional on the level of democratic 
accountability, and the VAT becomes more crucial for autocracies in improving human 
development.6  
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In sum, the introduction of the VAT generally increases revenue and/or improves 
government effectiveness, thereby contributing to human development, but its contribution to 
human development is expectedly mitigated by democratic accountability. Table 1 
summarizes the main expectations based on the VAT¶V introduction and regime type. 
Concurring with the existing views on the pervasive effect of democracy on human 
development, we expect democratic accountability, regardless of the presence or absence of 
the VAT, to improve human development. But we argue that regardless of regime type, the 
VAT can ameliorate human development by strengthening state capacity. The most important 
expectation for our study among four outcomes is found in autocracies without electoral 
accountability. We expect that the VAT has the most positive impact on human development 
in that combination. From the discussion, we summarize the main hypothesis as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: The relative impact of the VAT on human development is greater when 
democratic accountability is lower.  
[Table 1 about here] 
We also examine why the VAT contributes to human development. We maintain that 
the VAT enhances state financial capacity through distinct channels: (1) the state¶V capacity to 
raise revenue to provide a financial source for human development; and (2) its capacity to 
increase tax compliance to make a more effective state apparatus. The capacities to raise tax 
revenue and secure tax compliance are certainly correlated, i.e., an increase in tax compliance 
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more likely results in larger revenues. However, they are not identical, because the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VHQIRUFHPHQWRIWD[FRPSOLDQFHDOVRrequires a strong hand to regulate the 
economy. 7RIRFXVRQWKHILUVWDVSHFWRIWKHVWDWH¶VILQDQFLDOFDSDFLW\we hypothesize that the 
introduction of the VAT results in human development through increased revenue.7 The 
hypothesis focused on revenue-raising is thus: 
HYPOTHESIS 2: A VWDWH¶VILQDQFLDOFDSDFLW\ to raise revenue intervenes in the 9$7¶V impact on 
human development.   
While contributing to greater revenue for developing countries, the VAT also serves 
to enhance tax compliance by businesses and traders. Unlike a direct tax (an income tax), 
which requires citizens to file taxes, the VAT is an indirect tax, which requires consumers to 
pay taxes but asks trading businesses to file tax returns only. In principle, all industries and 
enterprises must comply with filing a flat rate tax on all stages of transactions in the VAT 
system (Pomeranz, 2015). This new tax-filing obligation facilitates WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶s tax 
enforcement and compliance effectively in developing economies that have large, informal 
sectors.8 The VAT encourages businesses to abandon a shadow economy and contribute to 
rationalizing and modernizing developing economies. Increasing compliance in growing 
economies accompanies a strong hand to regulate domestic markets and rationalize economic 
activities, thereby generally making the state apparatus more effective in providing public 
services. We thus derive the following hypothesis: 
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HYPOTHESIS 3: A state¶V capacity to ensure the compliance of tax payers intervenes in the 
9$7¶VLPSDFWRQKXPDQGHYHORSPHQW 
 
Empirical Analyses 
Data 
We test the effect of the introduction of the VAT on human development with a 
cross-national, time-series dataset that includes 170 countries and covers the period between 
1970 and 2007. Building on previous studies that focus on the relationship between 
democracy and human development, we compiled a dataset based on the Varieties of 
Democracy (V-Dem, version 6.2) database (Coppedge et al., 2016). The novelty of our 
analysis is that it examines how taxation affects human development through the formation of 
state financial capacity after the introduction of VAT. For this purpose, we add VAT-related 
variables to the analysis.  
Following the existing literature (Gerring et al., 2016; Miller, 2015; Ross, 2006), 
we focus on the infant mortality rate as a dependent variable, which is measured as the 
number of deaths prior to age one per 1,000 live births in a year. The infant mortality data 
come originally from Gapminder, and missing values were imputed (see also Ross 2006 on 
the impact of missing values). We take the logarithm of the infant mortality rate to factor in 
WKHYDULDEOH¶VGLPLQLVKLQJUHWXUQFKDUDFWHULVWLFV2WKHUKXPDQGHYHORSPHQWPHDVXUHVDUHDOVR
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available, but the infant mortality measure is better for the following three reasons. First, the 
variable has fewer measurement error issues, because the definition and operationalization 
are relatively clear compared with other popular measures, such as education variables.9 
Further, compared to composite indices, such as the Human Development Index, infant 
mortality rates do not have to deal with aggregation problems (see also Munck and Verkuilen, 
2002). Finally, infant mortality rates usually have strong temporal and spatial coverage, 
partly because the data collection process can go backward in time (Riley, 2005).  
The independent variable is the VAT introduction, which is coded 1 in the 
subsequent years after the introduction of the VAT and 0 otherwise. The variable is a 
reasonable proxy to test our argument when reliable revenue data of the VAT in the third 
wave countries are not available. Although the variable may be an indirect measure of the 
impact of the VAT, once introduced, the VAT has generally ensured that developing 
countries extract much larger revenues from consumption than before its introduction (Bird 
and Gendron, 2007b; Gillis, 1989; Gordon, 2010a). The introduction of the VAT is 
considered to capture the fiscal contribution of the VAT. We also construct a VAT (%GDP) 
variable as our secondary measure. This variable represents consumption tax revenue after 
the VAT was introduced.10 Without reliable revenue data for the VAT, this variable is a 
reasonable alternative, because once adopted, the VAT constitutes most of the consumption 
tax revenue of the state. However, this variable still includes a large number of missing 
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values and is thus used for a robustness check for the main analysis with the VAT 
introduction variable.  
To represent the impact of electoral accountability, we use the Multiplicative 
Electoral Democracy Index (MEDI), which the literature uses to capture electoral 
accountability and contribute to a decline in the infant mortality rate (Gerring et al., 2016; 
Miller, 2015). The MEDI variable is constructed based on five components: clean elections, 
election of a chief executive, extensive suffrage, freedom of association, and freedom of 
expression (Gerring et al., 2016).11 $FFRUGLQJWR*HUULQJHWDOWKH³LQGH[GUDZV
on indicators that tap into the institutional procedures´RISRO\DUFK\ by Dahl (1989), 
LQFOXGLQJ³the extent of responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens 
through the mechanism of competitive elections.´$VDQDOWHUQDWLYHPHDVXUHZHDOVRXVH
Unified Democracy Scores (UDS) (Pemstein et al., 2010). The UDS variable is constructed 
by using a Bayesian latent variable model with existing measures of democracy. We use an 
interaction term of the MEDI with the VAT introduction to examine our hypothesis about the 
different impacts of the VAT on human development, depending on the level of democracy 
(Hypothesis 1).  
The analysis also includes all the covariates employed in the analyses of Gerring et 
al. (2016) and several additional variables that may affect both infant mortality and the 
introduction of the VAT. These potential confounders are: GDP per capita, GDP growth, 
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urbanization, fertility rate, internal and external conflicts, corruption, and resource abundance. 
All the covariates come from the V-Dem database. See Table 2 for summary statistics. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Design 
 Our main specification is the following fixed effect models:  
yit = Ѝxit-1 + Ўzit-1 + Аi + Џt + Рit 
where yit is the logarithm of infant mortality rate in country i at time t, and xit-1 is the VAT 
introduction in country i at time t-1. zit-1 is a vector of covariates. Following previous studies 
(Gerring et al., 2016; Ross, 2006), we also include country-fixed effectsАi and year-fixed 
effectsЏt to control for unobserved country-specific factors and common shocks.12 Finally, 
to control for the persistent nature of infant mortality, we also include a lagged dependent 
variable.13  
 
Results 
Table 3 reports our main result. Model 1 uses the VAT (%GDP) variable, and we 
find that as tax revenue increases after the VAT introduction, infant mortality rates tend to 
decrease. Model 2 employs the VAT introduction variable instead of the VAT (%GDP) 
variable, and we find results similar to those in Model 1, even when we control for 
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time-invariant, unobserved heterogeneity across countries. This suggests that the VAT, once 
introduced, generally improves human development measured by infant mortality.  
[Table 3 about here] 
Model 3 adds an interaction term to Model 2 between the VAT introduction and MEDI 
variables and examines whether the effect of the VAT on human development varies, 
depending on the level of electoral accountability (Hypothesis 1). First, the result shows that 
the main effects of the interaction model are both negative (statistically significant, at least at 
the 5% level). This indicates that both the VAT and electoral accountability have an 
independent effect on a decline in infant mortality rates, which is consistent with our 
expectation. Second, we find that the interaction term is statistically significant, but the sign of 
the coefficient is positive. To see the interaction effect visually, we plot predicted probabilities 
of infant mortality rates based on the VAT introduction and MEDI variables (based on Model 2 
of Table 3). Figure 1 shows a clear interaction effect: when electoral accountability is low, the 
VAT has a significant, negative impact on infant mortality, but, as accountability improves, the 
effect of the VAT diminishes, and the VAT loses a statistical significance in societies with a 
higher level of electoral accountability. In substantive terms, if a country introduces the VAT 
when the regime type is autocratic (defined here as when the MEDI is at the 25th percentile), the 
probability of the infant mortality rate in a given year for observation decreases by 1.4%, with 
all other variables held at the mean values (based on Model 3).  
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The result above supports Hypothesis 1: the effect of the VAT on human development 
depends on the level of electoral accountability. First, high electoral accountability tends to 
decrease infant mortality as argued in Gerring et al. (2016). Second, in a society with low 
electoral accountability, the VAT can play a significant role in decreasing infant mortality 
rates. This novel finding, which is also complementary with previous studies of electoral 
accountability and human development, implies an alternative channel to improve human 
development. Thus it has a significant policy implication: policy makers can improve human 
development without relying on electoral accountability. 
The results for covariates find that GDP growth contributes to decreased infant 
mortality, which is consistent with the development literature (Nishiyama, 2011).14 The 
lagged dependent variable is positive and statistically significant, confirming the persistent 
nature of the variable and suggesting that the lagged dependent variable (t-1) accounts for 
some variation in the contemporaneous development variable (t).  
Finally, as a robustness check, we employ a different democracy measure (UDS) instead 
of the MEDI variable and provide additional evidence for Hypothesis 1 (Table 4). Across all 
the models, results with the UDS variable (Table 4) are similar to those with the MEDI 
variable (Table 3), which suggests that the findings are not sensitive to particular democracy 
measures and specifications. 
[Table 4 about here] 
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Mediation Analysis 
Thus far, we find robust evidence that the VAT decreases infant mortality in a 
country with low electoral accountability. In this section, we further examine the causal 
mechanisms behind the relationship and how the VAT improves human capital without 
relying on electoral accountability. First, to measure the capacity for revenue-raising in 
Hypothesis 2, we use the Tax revenue variable, which represents the level of total tax revenue 
WRFDSWXUHWKHVWDWH¶VRYHUDOOILQDQFLDOFDSDFLW\WRLPSURYHKXPDQGHYHORSPHQW The Tax 
revenue variable comes from the World Bank and employs WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VWD[UHYHQXHDV
proportions of GDP.15 For a state¶Vcapacity to ensure tax compliance (Hypothesis 3), we use 
the Shadow economy variable as a dependent variable. Although a state¶V capacity for 
compliance is considered an elusive concept (Mann, 1984; Soifer and vom Hau, 2008), recent 
studies regard Shadow economy as a reasonable measure for state capacity (Buehn and 
Schneider, 2012; Ottervik, 2013). The analysis operationalizes the Shadow economy variable 
using the size of the shadow economy relative to all legal economic activity.16 
To examine the causal mechanisms proposed in Hypotheses 2 and 3, we employ a 
causal mediation analysis proposed by Imai, Keele and Tingley (2010) (See also Imai, Keele, 
Tingley and Yamamoto (2011)). The causal mediation analysis relies on a potential outcome 
framework to identify the indirect effects or average causal mediated effects (ACME). One 
first estimate models for the observed outcome and mediators and then simulates model 
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parameters from the sampling distribution to compute the causal mediation effects in the 
second stage. 
By using the Tax Revenue and Shadow economy variables as a mediator, we are 
interested in examining how the impact of the VAT on human development operates through 
increasing state capacity for revenue raising and tax compliance. Because the VAT, Tax 
Revenue, and Shadow economy variables are all observational variables, we include the same 
control variables as in Table 2. We use OLS for both the first and second stages of the 
analysis to estimate the effect of the VAT on the mediator and the effect of the VAT on infant 
mortality through state capacity. Because we are interested in the effect of the VAT in 
countries with low electoral accountability (refer to Figure 1), we limit the sample for 
autocratic countries by using the median cut-off of the MEDI variable. Finally, given the 
nature of causal mediation analysis, we transform our time-series data into cross-sectional 
data by aggregating all the variables. We use the latest value for infant mortality, which is our 
dependent variable, and the median values of each variable as a baseline.17 
Table 5 shows the results of the causal mediation analysis. The top panel shows the 
estimates of the first stage, and the bottom panel reports the estimate of the indirect effect of 
WKHPHGLDWRU³$&0(´RQWKHWDEOHDVZHOODVKRZPXFKRIWKHPHGLDWRUDFFRXQWVIRUWKH
WRWDOHIIHFWRIWKH9$7LQWURGXFWLRQ³RI7RWDOYLD$&0(´on the far right of the table). 
First, the top panel shows that the VAT introduction has a positive impact on tax revenue, but 
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the relationship is not statistically significant at the 10% level. However, as expected, the 
9$7¶VLQWURGXFWLRQUHGXFHVWKHVL]H of the shadow economy, and the effect is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. More important, the bottom panel shows the causal mechanisms 
± although the VAT does not affect human development through tax revenue, the VAT 
contributes to a decline in infant mortality by reducing the size of the shadow economy. The 
latter indirect effect through state capacity is statistically significant at the 10% level.18 It 
also shows that the indirect effect accounts for 29.4% of the overall effect of the VAT on 
infant mortality. The result rejects Hypothesis 2 but is consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Although the analysis confirms that one of our hypothesized mechanisms is actually 
present, there are two potential concerns for the analysis that may affect our interpretation. 
First, because we aggregate our time-series data into a cross-sectional format, the analysis is 
VXEMHFWWRWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VDUELWUDU\GHFLVLRQRIKRw to transform the data. Second, given that 
a causal mediation analysis is better suited for an experimental design, our analysis may also 
be subject to certain omitted variable bias. Further, although observable covariates are 
included in the analysis for control, a mediation analysis involves the problem of possible 
reverse causality ± countries with a larger shadow economy are more likely to introduce the 
VAT, thereby decreasing infant mortality. However, the possibility of the reverse causality is 
unlikely if we closely examine how the VAT is adopted in developing economies.19 The 
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strength of the VAT lies in its neutrality in economic activities, which is important for 
developing economies to adjust to global markets without interfering with economic 
development. Therefore, economic organizations, such as the IMF, have encouraged 
developing countries to adopt the VAT as a revenue-raising measure that is compatible with 
economic development. Although the VAT is expected to alleviate the adverse effects of 
informal sectors and this side-effect is regarded as desirable, its revenue-raising power is a 
driving force for the adoption of the VAT. The presence of a large shadow economy does not 
increase the possibility of the VAT introduction among developing and developed economies.  
 
Autocracy and human development 
We now move to a discussion of the implications of our findings to the literature of 
autocracy and human development. Although previous studies find a positive association 
between human development and democracy (Gerring et al., 2012; Gerring et al., 2016; 
Hanson, 2015; Ross, 2006), the recent literature argues that autocracies can also promote 
human development if contested elections contribute to increasing government accountability 
(Miller 2015).  
However, our findings suggest that even with the absence of democratic pressure, 
autocrats can improve human development through the introduction of regressive taxation if 
they have an incentive to do so. Indeed, previous studies suggest that autocrats can sometimes 
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promote the welfare of people for some strategic reasons, such as economic development and 
co-optation of opposition groups. In European history, for example, the authoritarian regime 
under Bismarck in Germany institutionalized social programs with limited political 
representation. Contemporary authoritarian regimes also distinguish between social programs 
on which to spend and which to avoid (Huber et al., 2008). Some autocrats also attempt to 
co-opt social groups that may become potential challengers to their own rule (Haber, 2007) 
and SXUVXH D ³FROOXVLYH´ VWUDWHJ\ ZKHQ LPSOHPHQWLQJ VRFLDO SROLFLHV (Mares and Carnes, 
2009). This results in variation in non-democratic, welfare states and argues that regime type 
fails to predict social expenditures (Mares and Carnes, 2009). In terms of human 
development and specifically infant mortality, no significant difference is found between 
democracies and non-democracies (Dietrich and Bernhard 2016).  
The existing literature has yet to examine the effect of state capacity on human 
development in autocratic countries.20 One reason for the lack of research is the absence of 
an appropriate concept for state capacity that can be operationalized across regime types in 
empirical research (Ottervik, 2013). To close this gap, we focused on taxation and 
distinguished state financial capacity to ensure tax compliance from state capacity to raise tax 
revenue. Our results offer empirical support for the argument that regressive taxation, by 
increasing compliance with state taxation in society, can explain variation in human 
development in autocracies, even in the absence of democratic pressure. 
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Placing human development in tax-democratization linkages 
The present study demonstrates that the state financial capacity with the VAT 
favorably affects human development in autocracies, but after regime transition, democratic 
accountability increases its importance at the expense of the regressive taxation. This 
conditional effect of the VAT in autocracies and democracies implies that there is a possible, 
long-run effect of regressive taxation on human development. This is the case in light of Kato 
DQG7DQDND¶V quantitative study demonstrating that the introduction of the VAT 
increases the likelihood of democratization. If regressive taxation really induces 
democratization, then we can expect that state financial capacity with the VAT improves 
human development in autocracies (in the short run, which is our finding). Further, increased 
democratic accountability through regressive taxation also improves human development 
after a regime transition (in the long-run).21 Building on the recent findings by Kato and 
Tanaka (2018), a cross-national comparison explores the long-term effect of the VAT on 
human development along with their tax-democratization linkage. For this purpose, we 
categorize both democracies and non-democracies by whether the state adopted the VAT as a 
revenue source under an autocracy, i.e., before democratic transition (Table 6). Each cell in 
Table 6 suggests potential paths for countries in terms of human development. 
The first- and second-wave countries belong to the upper-right category of 
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³democratization without the VAT introduction (under autocracy),´because they had no way 
to adopt the VAT under an autocracy. The VAT gave new life to modern consumption taxation 
in the 1950s after the two early waves consolidated their democratic regimes (see Kato and 
Toyofuku, 2018). Twenty-nine of the fifty-one countries in this category are stable 
democracies that belong to the first and second waves of democratizers. This category also 
includes some third-wave democratizers, such as the former socialist countries, which 
introduced the VAT immediately after regime transition.22  
Most of the third wave of democratizers are included in the upper-left category 
(democratization with the VAT introduction (under autocracy)). In this category, twenty-nine 
countries were democratized within 9.8 years, on average, after the autocratic introduction of 
the VAT, and five autocratic countries showed clear signs of democratic transition.23 Here, 
human development is expected to improve with the introduction of the VAT in autocracies, 
and with democratic accountability after regime transition in the long run as well. 
 Autocracies in the lower-ULJKWFDWHJRU\³QR democratization without the VAT 
introducWLRQ´DUHH[WUDQHRXVFDVHV5HVRXUFH-rich autocracies,24 which could finance the 
state by rents from natural resources, account for the majority, i.e., thirteen out of thirty-one 
countries (41.9%).25 In contrast, the cases in the lower-OHIWFDWHJRU\RI³QR democratization 
with the VAT introduction´ pose a challenge. The absence of regime transition may plausibly 
nullify the positive impact of the VAT on human development under autocracies, because 
  22 
further improvement is not expected without an advance in democratic accountability in the 
long run. These countries, however, have shown a clear sign of regime transition. All but two 
RIWKHIRUW\FRXQWULHVWKDWKDYHQRW\HWGHPRFUDWL]HG\HDUVRQDYHUDJHDIWHUWKH9$7¶V
introduction now show signs of democratization.26 Therefore, a further improvement in 
human development is expected in non-democracies. 
The VAT improves human development through increased state capacity to ensure 
tax compliance. However, when autocracies experience the instability of regime transition, 
reversion, and stagnation (please see also Figure 1), taxation can also improve human 
development indirectly by encouraging democratic transition. The tax-democratization 
linkage is confirmed in a cross-national examination and suggests that our result is consistent 
with the democratic effect on human development found in previous studies (Gerring et al. 
2016).  
  
Conclusion 
This study argues and finds empirical evidence that the institutionalization of the 
VAT contributes to human development through enforcing tax compliance, even when the 
democratic pressure to serve the interests of citizens is absent. In other words, the presence of 
the VAT has a significant impact on decreasing infant mortality in autocracies with low 
electoral accountability, whereas higher accountability outweighs the impact of the VAT in 
  23 
democracies. This suggests that despite its regressive nature, the VAT facilitates rather than 
thwarts the welfare of the people living in autocracies that have been and are about to 
democratize VLQFHWKHWKLUGZDYH$VWDWH¶VFDSDFLW\WRJDLQWD[FRPSOLDQFHLQWHUYHQHV
critically in the improvement of human development in contemporary autocracies. Our 
comparative analysis of tax-democratization linkages further confirms that the role of the 
VAT in autocratic states complements the long-term effect of the state capacity on human 
development after a regime transition. 
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1
 The taxation literature concurs that developing countries since the third wave have failed to implement 
progressive income taxes effectively (for example, see Bahl and Bird, 2008; Barreix, Garcimartin and Velayos, 
2013; Bräutigam, Fjeldstad and Moore, 2008; Gordon, 2010a; Stiglitz, 2010).  
2
 This statement assumes that there is little redistribution to the poor. 
 
4
 This may refute the pessimistic view that democratic states support middle- and upper-income classes rather 
than the poor (Ross, 2006). 
5
 The weakness of income taxation, which is the opposite side of the same coin, questions state financial 
capacity in general. For example, Rogers and Weller (2014) argue that the income tax, rather than the VAT, 
serves as a valid indicator of state capacity because the VAT is easier to collect than an income tax. 
6 We will discuss why autocrats have incentives to do this in Discussion. 
7
 The state revenue-raising is expected to lead to more transparency and less corruption and increase democratic 
accountability (Baskaran and Bigsten, 2013). We discuss a long-term effect of the VAT on democratic 
accountability in the Discussion section. 
8 In a VAT system, for example, retailers pay a VAT on their wholesale inputs and transfer those tax amounts in 
charges to their customers. Retailers in informal sectors have no invoices and thus cannot transfer the tax to their 
customers, which reduces their competitive edge against retailers in formal sectors. 
9 For example, literacy variables face the incomparability of languages and variation in literacy standards across 
countries.  
10
 This variable can be constructed by interacting a VAT introduction dummy variable with the consumption tax 
revenue. The revenue data of the consumption tax are obtained from WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RQHWDU\)XQG,0)¶V
Government Financial Statistics  
11 The index tends to score high when (a) elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities, 
(b) the chief executive of a country is selected (directly or indirectly) through elections, (c) suffrage is extensive, 
(d) political and civil society organizations operate freely, and (e) there is freedom of expression, including 
access to alternative information (Gerring et al. 2016: 16).  
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12
 Because the fixed-effect models lead to a loss of within-country variation, we also conduct results using the 
random-effect model as an alternative specification (results not reported). 
13
 Although the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable can lead to an inconsistent estimator, the fixed-effect 
estimator should become consistent when the time span becomes larger. According to Beck and Katz (2011), an 
appropriate time span is twenty years or more. The average time span for our dataset is thirty-four years. In any 
case, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable would lead to underestimation only, rather than to 
overestimation (Beck and Katz, 2011).    
14 Although Model 1 shows no significant result for the variable, we believe that the inclusion of our variable of 
VAT revenue as a proportion of GDP has something to do with the inconsistency. 
15
 %HFDXVH QRW DOO WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V WD[ UHYHQXH JRHV WR DPHOLRUDWLQJ LQIDQW PRUWDOLW\ Ze also use a more 
specific measure - a Health expenditure variable. The results are largely similar. 
16
 This operationalization also follows Ottervik (2013)¶V GHILQLWLRQ ZKLFK FRQVLGHUV state capacity to be the 
ability of the state to dominate, i.e. coax compliant behavior from the individuals of a given territory; he 
operationalizes this as tax compliance.  
17
 For the Shadow economy variable, we use ǻ6KDGRZ HFRQRP\, which measures how much the VAT has 
improved state capacity by taking the difference between the latest and median values. Here, because the 
Shadow economy variable is not available at the beginning of our observation, we use the median values for the 
Shadow economy variable as a proxy for the baseline value. 
18
 This is largely due to the relatively small sample size (N = 68). 
19
 See the following literature to find out the strength of the VAT system and reasons for its adoption by 
developing economies. Bird and Gendron (2007b); Bräutigam (2008); Corbacho, Cibils, and Lora (2013); Ebrill 
et al. (2001); Gordon (2010b); Profeta and Scabrosetti (2010); Sandford (2000). 
20
 Miller (2015, 1537) has argued that electoral authoritarianism plausibly increases the state¶V capacity, but he 
has neither examined directly a state¶V capacity nor its impact on human development under autocracies. 
21
 It is also possible that instead of democratizing, the VAT can co-opt citizens by improving human 
development. It can help stabilize and prolong autocracies, and the enhanced state financial capacity may work 
against human development in the long run by keeping democratic accountability low. However, Kato and 
Tanaka (2018) observe the opposite trend. 
22
 Some third-wave democratizers are included but constitute clear exceptions. We count three southern 
European counties that democratized in the 1970s, when the VAT had just started to diffuse, and ten former, 
socialist countries. All of them except Serbia and Montenegro are now EU member countries. Serbia and 
Montenegro were also candidates for EU membership as of 2016. Among the remaining nine countries in this 
category, five are small countries with a population below three million: Mongolia, Botswana, Cape Verde, 
Solomon Islands, and Comoros. Four countries - Madagascar, Philippines, El Salvador, and Paraguay - 
democratized in the 1990s without the VAT, but introduced it after one or two years.  
23
 7KHVHFRXQWULHV³Transition away from Autocracy´LQFUHDVHGWKHLUSROLW\VFRUHVE\PRUHWKDQRQHVWDQGDUG
deviation after the introduction. 
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24
 They are defined above the 75th percentile of the country-average Resource Abundance variable. 
25
 The introduction of the VAT might be less likely in resource-rich countries, but the effect of its introduction 
can be even larger in those countries that have natural resources. For example, resource-rich countries were less 
OLNHO\WRUHPDLQDXWRFUDWLFDIWHUWKH9$7¶VLQWURGXFWLRQWKDQQRQ-resource rich countries. In the key category of 
³UHSUHVHQWDWLRQZLWK UHJUHVVLYH WD[DWLRQ´ IRU H[DPSOHHOHYHQRXWRI thirty-four) of democratizers are 
resource-rich countries with the VAT. Among autocracies that introduced the VAT with little sign of democratic 
WUDQVLWLRQ ³QR UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ ZLWK UHJUHVVLYH WD[DWLRQ´ FRXQWULHV KRZHYHU WKH SURSRUWLRQ RI UHVRXUFH-rich 
countries is lower, i.e., 20% (nine out of forty-one). In terms of the polity score by which democracy is defined 
by a larger value than 6, the positive effect of the VAT in resource-rich countries is more evident than in 
non-resource-rich ones. Without the VAT, the average polity score of resource-rich countries is 2.69 points lower 
than the score for other non-resource-rich countries. Among countries with the VAT, however, the average score 
of resource-rich countries is only 0.54 points lower than non-resource-rich countries. Within-country 
comparison before and after the VAT introduction further confirms this. Resource-rich countries increased their 
polity score by 7.62 points after the introduction, whereas other countries increased the score only by 6.19 
points. 
26
 Five countries were formerly GHPRFUDWL]HGEXWKDYHUHYHUWHG WRDXWRFUDFLHV ³Democracy failed´$PRQJ
two exceptions that have remained stable autocracies for more than twenty years after the introduction of the 
VAT, Morocco has not reached even the threshold of a so-FDOOHG³Dutocracy´íRUJUHDWHUDQGRUOHVVLQWKH
polity score), whereas Tunisia has been soPHZKHUHLQWKHPLGGOHRIWKH³DXWRFUDFLHV´VLQFH until 2012. 
Tables and Figures
Table 1: Theoretical expectations
VAT introduction
Yes No
Democracy Infant mortality ↓ Infant mortality ↓
Autocracy Infant mortality ↓ Infant mortality →
1
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Infant mortality rate 3.628 1.029 0.79 5.37
VAT (%GDP), t-1 4.232 2.114 0.00 9.37
VAT introduction, t-1 0.367 0.482 0.00 1.00
MEDI, t-1 0.270 0.326 0.00 0.93
Mean democracy score, t-1 -0.026 0.988 -2.04 2.25
Infant mortality rate, t-1 3.661 1.021 0.83 5.41
ln(GDP pc), t-1 7.976 1.098 5.32 10.67
GDP growth, t-1 1.505 6.167 -61.49 86.95
Urbanization, t-1 0.467 0.235 0.02 0.97
Fertility rate, t-1 1.306 0.559 0.11 2.22
Internal conflict, t-1 0.160 0.367 0.00 1.00
External conflict, t-1 0.053 0.224 0.00 1.00
Corruption, t-1 0.493 0.271 0.01 0.95
Resource abundance pc, t-1 3.663 2.620 0.00 11.30
2
Table 3: Baseline analysis
(1) (2) (3)
VAT (%GDP), t-1 -0.005**
(0.003)
VAT introduction, t-1 -0.009*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004)
MEDI, t-1 0.048** -0.009 -0.019**
(0.022) (0.008) (0.008)
VAT*MEDI, t-1 0.017**
(0.007)
Infant mortality rate, t-1 0.970*** 0.982*** 0.986***
(0.028) (0.006) (0.005)
ln(GDP pc), t-1 -0.035 0.002 0.002
(0.049) (0.006) (0.006)
GDP growth, t-1 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Urbanization, t-1 -0.053 0.029 0.034
(0.208) (0.038) (0.038)
Fertility rate, t-1 -0.070 0.014** 0.011
(0.056) (0.007) (0.007)
Internal conflict, t-1 -0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
External conflict, t-1 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Corruption, t-1 0.137** -0.014 -0.010
(0.061) (0.010) (0.010)
Resource abundance pc, t-1 0.008 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.346 0.000 -0.014
(0.397) (0.058) (0.057)
R-squared 0.993 0.997 0.997
Observations 406 3751 3751
3
Figure 1: Probability of infant mortality, by the VAT and electoral accountability
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Table 4: Baseline analysis with the UDS variable
(1) (2) (3)
VAT (%GDP), t-1 -0.005*
(0.003)
VAT introduction, t-1 -0.009*** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.003)
Mean democracy score, t-1 0.007 -0.002 -0.004*
(0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
VAT*UDS, t-1 0.005**
(0.003)
Infant mortality rate, t-1 0.975*** 0.982*** 0.985***
(0.028) (0.006) (0.006)
ln(GDP pc), t-1 -0.024 0.003 0.003
(0.048) (0.006) (0.006)
GDP growth, t-1 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Urbanization, t-1 -0.011 0.025 0.031
(0.210) (0.038) (0.039)
Fertility rate, t-1 -0.067 0.014** 0.012*
(0.057) (0.007) (0.007)
Internal conflict, t-1 -0.008 0.001 0.001
(0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
External conflict, t-1 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Corruption, t-1 0.077* -0.011 -0.006
(0.043) (0.009) (0.010)
Resource abundance pc, t-1 0.008 0.002 0.002
(0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.261 -0.007 -0.022
(0.398) (0.058) (0.057)
R-squared 0.993 0.997 0.997
Observations 406 3746 3746
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Table 5: Mediation analysis: VAT introduction as a Treatment
DV: Tax Revenue DV: ∆ Shadow Economy
VAT Introduction
3.084 -2.948**
(1.967) (1.205)
DV: Infant mortality
ACME Direct effect Total effect
% of Total
via ACME
Mediator: Tax Revenue 0.035 -0.104 -0.068 20.0%
Mediator: ∆ Shadow Economy -0.050* -0.125 -0.176** 29.4%
6
Table 6: A New Typology of Regressive Taxation and Democratization
With VAT Introduction under Autocracy Without VAT Introduction under Autocracy
Democratization
Democratized Transition away from Autocracy Democratized pre-1970 Democratized post-1970
Dominican Rep Peru Kyrgyzstan Canada Colombia Ex-communist
Argentina Bolivia Niger Jamaica Uruguay Czech Mongolia
Macedonia Chile Nigeria Costa Rica France Slovenia Botswana
Estonia Kenya Haiti UK United States Lithuania Cape Verde
Ukraine Indonesia Malawi Ireland Mauritius Poland Solomon Islands
Benin Nicaragua Netherlands Trinidad Bulgaria Comoros
Zambia Korea South Belgium Turkey Latvia Lesotho
Moldova Brazil Switzerland Slovakia
Romania Lebanon Austria Germany Madagascar
South Africa Italy Serbia Philippines
Ghana Cyprus Montenegro El Salvador
Albania Finland Paraguay
Mali Sweden S. European
Honduras Norway Portugal
Hungary Denmark Spain
Senegal Japan Greece
Mexico Australia
Croatia New Zealand
Guatemala Israel
Panama India
No Democratization
Democracy Failed Remained Autocratic Remained Autocratic
Thailand Bangladesh Kazakhstan Cuba Kuwait
Pakistan Namibia Cameroon Guyana Bahrain
Venezuela Russia Gabon Guinea Bissau Qatar
Belarus CAR Uganda Gambia UAE
Armenia Mozambique Rwanda Ivory Coast Oman
Sri Lanka Zimbabwe Liberia Afghanistan
Nepal Eq. Guinea Sierra Leone Korea North
Fiji Burkina Faso DRC Bhutan
Georgia Tunisia Burundi Myanmar
PNG Mauritania Somalia Laos
Cambodia Congo Djibouti Malaysia
Azerbaijan Egypt Eritrea
Ethiopia Tajikistan Angola
Ecuador Algeria Swaziland
Guinea Sudan Libya
Tanzania China Iran
Togo Vietnam Iraq
Chad Morocco Syria
Jordan Turkmenistan Saudi Arabia
Singapore Uzbekistan Yemen
Note: Data derive from Bird and Gendron (2007) for taxation data and from the Polity IV project for regime data, respectively. The
table demonstrates that a country democratizes when the polity score exceeds 6. “Polity Increased” is defined as at least one standard
deviation increase in the polity score after the introduction of the VAT. “Democracy Failed” is defined as a decrease in the polity
score after the introduction of the VAT. Among the countries listed in Bird and Gendron (2007), we omit countries that no longer
existed in 2008 (i.e., USSR, Yugoslavia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia) and therefore have not introduced the VAT. Further, we consider the
United States, Comoros, and Solomon Islands to be outliers, because they are the only three democracies without the VAT.
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